Intended R&amp;D Knowledge Spillover - Strategy for Innovation Leadership by Harryson, Sigvald & Søberg, Peder Veng
 
  
 
Aalborg Universitet
Intended R&D Knowledge Spillover - Strategy for Innovation Leadership
Harryson, Sigvald; Søberg, Peder Veng
Published in:
10th International CINet Conference
Publication date:
2009
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Harryson, S., & Søberg, P. V. (2009). Intended R&D Knowledge Spillover - Strategy for Innovation Leadership.
In 10th International CINet Conference: "Enhancing the Innovation Environment" Continuous Innovation
Network. http://www.continuous-innovation.net/publications.html
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: November 30, 2020
1 
 
INTENDED R&D  KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVER – INNOVATION STRATEGY FOR 
INNOVATION LEADERSHIP 
Sigvald Harryson1, Peder Veng Søberg2  
1Associate Professor, Lund University School of Economics and Management; Visiting 
Associate Professor at Copenhagen Business School, Inn vation and Organizational 
Economics, Kilevej 14A, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Phone: +46 708 348966, Email: 
sh.ino@cbs.dk  
2Ph.D. student at Baltic Business School, Sweden, Phone: +4551341155, E-mail: 
Peder.Soberg@hik.se 
 
Abstract 
Given the increasing focus on intellectual capital as the most valuable assets 
of many knowledge intensive companies, we might assume that the knowledge 
constituting valuable intellectual capital should ieally be kept secret for 
entities external to the company. This protective logic may, however, inhibit 
companies striving for innovation leadership. In our enquiry into R&D 
knowledge spillover effects on innovation, we develop case studies from 
Porsche and Tetra Pak. The resulting theoretical frmework, built on selected 
networking and knowledge creation theories, is illustrated through the two 
case studies and useful for further analysis of positive R&D knowledge 
spillover effects. 
 
By proactively facilitating knowledge sharing with relevant parts of the 
surrounding environment, the company enables itself o feed knowledge into 
its surrounding environment - thereby developing the innovation potential of 
the environment for exploration purposes, and the opportunities to identify 
and to feed knowledge back to the company for exploitation purposes, from the 
same environment. 
 
Keywords: positive knowledge spillover, networked innovation, knowledge 
creation. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Knowledge spillover is generally mentioned in the lit rature as something potentially 
negative and as something, which for instance, MNCs investing in knowledge intensive 
activities in emerging economies have to consider. Given the increasing focus on 
intellectual capital as the most valuable assets of many knowledge intensive companies, 
it may be logical to assume that the knowledge constituting valuable intellectual capital 
should ideally be kept secret for entities external to the company. This protective logic 
may, however, inhibit companies striving for innovation leadership. Negative R&D 
knowledge spillover can be defined as the use, by competitors, of spillover knowledge, 
in ways which are directly or indirectly harming the company. Such harming ways 
could be the unwelcomed establishment of competing companies based on spillover 
knowledge. Another example could be simple disclosure of information which could 
otherwise have been turned into valuable and strategically important IPR. An 
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underlying assumption of this article is that innovation is to a high extent driven by 
individuals. Allen (1977) and Allen and Henn (2006) explain why the R&D output per 
R&D employee generally decreases when the number of R&D employees increases in 
an R&D department. One interpretation of these results would suggest that it is equally 
if not more important to have access to the right external R&D brains than having 
internal ownership of many R&D brains, since the number of R&D employees it is 
possible to manage, still maintaining relative effectiveness, may be limited. This article 
explores how knowledge spillover can be used to ident fy the right R&D brains to get 
access to. Our enquiry into R&D knowledge spillover (knowledge spillover) effects on 
innovation is based on empirical material from Porsche and Tetra Pak and it speaks to 
the following themes of the 10th CINet conference: 
• Innovation in emerging economies 
• Open innovation 
• New product development & continuous innovation 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
2.1 INTRODUCING A NETWORK PERSPECTIVE TO ANALYZE INNOVATION   
Several authors (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981; Andersson, 1998; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1989; Easton, 1992; Håkansson and Ford, 2002; Håkansson and Henders, 1992; 
Håkansson and Laage-Hellman, 1984; Laage-Hellman, 1997; Jansson et al., 1990; 
Harryson, 2002; Johansson and Elg, 2002) have adopte  a network perspective in which 
relationships and linkage patterns constitute the cor element of analysis. Some general 
elements of a network perspective are: 
• Networks typically emerge because no organization is self-sufficient, but rather 
dependent on extra-organizational resources for its sustained competitiveness;  
• A network perspective aims at understanding the totali y of relationships and 
how they jointly accomplish the result; 
• Networks are often divided into different levels so as to better concentrate the 
level of analysis to a specific phenomenon where the main-activities happen at 
that specific level of the network. 
We attempt to build theory having networking theory as a starting point Our paper uses 
theories on networking (Ahuja, 2000; Uzzi and Dunlap, 2005), and knowledge creation  
We certainly know that ‘no business is an island’ (Håkansson and Snehota, 1989; 
Håkansson and Johanson, 2001) in today’s business context. Sophisticated networks 
support creation and application of knowledge all the way through from key-suppliers 
to the factory complex where social interaction between individuals, groups and 
organizations is fundamental to the corporate knowledge creation process.  
Håkansson (1987; 1989; 1990) considers how companies handle their technological 
development in relation to external clients and organizations, particularly in terms of 
collaborative projects, claiming that the question is not how the company manages its 
technological development per se, but ‘how it manages to relate its technological 
development to what is happening inside and between other organizations’ (Håkansson, 
1990, 371). In line with the essence of holism, the right combination of technologies 
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and skills often yields a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. Accordingly, it is 
essential to know where these parts are and, more essential still, to know who can best 
contribute to their transfer and transformation, and i tegrate the parts into a greater 
whole (Harryson, 1998; Uzzi and Dunlap, 2005). 
While the transaction cost perspective takes transactions as given, instead of considering 
their creation, and stresses the efficiency benefits from reducing the governance cost of 
a transaction, a network perspective allows consideration of the strategic benefits from 
optimizing not just a single relationship but the firm’s entire network of relationships, or 
know-who (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Harryson, 2000; 2006). Indeed, a firm’s alliance 
formation capabilities and the resulting networks can be thought of as creating 
inimitable and non-substitutable value as inimitable resources by themselves, and as a 
means to access further inimitable resources and capabilities (Gulati et al., 2000; Powell 
et al., 1996; Van Wijk et al., 2003). 
 
2.1.1 THE SYNERGY BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL NETWORKING 
Companies that move from know-how to know-who make extraordinarily effectivei and 
efficientii use of external networking to acquire both tacit and explicit knowledge with 
and from extracorporate centers of excellence. These external knowledge links free up 
employees in the company to participate in sophisticated processes of internal 
networking with three critical objectives: 
1. To make corporate synergies in R&D possible through more effective transfer, 
transformation and application of knowledge across divisions and business units. 
2. To increase R&D efficiency by ensuring that all R&D activities are attuned to 
market needs and marketing and sales (M&S) activities. 
3. To enhance R&D effectiveness by securing an earlier and more intensive 
knowledge transfer between R&D and design and manufact ring (D&M).  
A failure to exploit synergies, attune R&D to market needs and turn the results into 
manufacturable products is more often than not a fundamental innovation barrier of 
companies that rely too strongly on internal technology development. This is why this 
book proposes more know-who-based approaches to entrepreneurship so as to capture 
unique synergies between internal and external networking to circumvent the barriers 
against innovation and even transform the worst ones into the best enablers of 
innovation.  
 
2.1.2 THE KNOW-WHO BASED APPROACH TO INNOVATION 
The know-who based approach to innovation aims at ident fying the essential parts that 
contribute to the corporate knowledge & innovation (K&I) management process. In this 
context, three interrelated levels with different foci can be outlined: 
 
1. Extracorporate creativity networks as primary sources of new knowledge and 
emerging technologies. 
2. Intracorporate process networks for more effective transformation of invention 
into innovation – across the key functions R&D, design & manufacturing 
(D&M), marketing & sales (M&S) and product management. 
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3. Project networks interlinking and combining the different (opposing) 
characteristics and benefits of the aforementioned creativity networks and 
process networks. 
As suggested by Figure 1, project networks are human networks that drive growth 
through innovation by building know-who links to span the organizational chasm 
between creativity the empirical section, creativity networks tend to be small by size 
and are usually self-managed in an organic fashion. By contrast, process networks are 
large in size and, therefore, typically managed by hierarchy in a mechanistic structure. It 
seems as if only human networks can bridge the chasm between creativity- and process 
networks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1  Driving GTI by Transforming Knowledge Creation into Business 
Implementation Through Human Networks 
 
2.1.3 THE PROCESS NETWORK AS HIERARCHY AND THE CREATIVITY NETWORK AS 
ARM’S LENGTH 
Connectivity, or, the degree to which the organizations or persons are linked to each 
other, is a major aspect of the network structure (Jansson, 2006). We can make a 
distinction between arm’s length (external) and hierarchical (internal) networks. Arms-
length relations are formed to facilitate concerted action on the part of autonomous 
organizations in situations where there is no formal authority to impose coordination, 
which corresponds to the structure of creativity networks. A network having an 
authority directly present within the network to contr l is defined as a hierarchical 
network, which corresponds to the process network in the theoretical framework. 
 
2.1.4 THE PROJECT NETWORK AS AN EXTENDED ACTION NETWORK 
The project network in Figure 1 is established to transform knowledge from the arm’s 
length creativity network into a product/service. When the task of this network is 
Large
Size of Unit/
Organization
Small
Organic/Heterarchic Managerial         Mechanistic/Hierarchic
Hierarchy
Process Networks for
Exploitation of Innovation
• Knowledge Transfer between 
R&D, D&M, Suppliers and M&S
• Alignment between R&D, M&S 
and Product Management
Project Networks driving Growth
Through Innovation 
by building Know-Who 
Links between Creativity-
and Process Networks
Creativity
Networks
for
Exploration 
of Invention
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completed, the project network is typically dissolved, and the units remaining in the 
organization network are awaiting formation of future project networks. Three project 
networks explored by (Harryson, 1998; 2002; 2006) demonstrated the same 
phenomenon: As they progressed from exploration to exploitation, they not only grew 
in size, but also went through a change in project l adership from a less senior person 
with informal management style to more senior and organizationally strongly positioned 
person. This is a reflection of the need to move from an open organic network to a more 
closed and hierarchic structure to manage the transi io  from exploration to exploitation. 
It is the management of this transition that can secure a conversion of knowledge 
creation into business implementation for implementation of innovation. 
The transition will be illustrated in the mini-case where Spiderman establishes a project 
network to develop a revolutionary ceramic brake system. This started as a rather 
organic team of externally networked employees, who identified and integrated 
complementary skills and technologies from a broad variety of creativity networks, such 
as universities, and also from a few process networks, such as specialized suppliers in 
Europe and in the USA. As the project network shifted its focus from exploration to 
exploitation, a selection of the previously external experts were internalized into a 
Porsche unit dedicated to commercializing the results. Through this integration, the 
project network partly transformed from an open arms-length network into a more 
closed and hierarchically controlled process network. 
 
2.1.5 DRAWING A LINK TO THE HYPERTEXT ORGANIZATION  
As an alternative attempt to clarify the distinction between action networks and 
hierarchical networks, Nonaka’s hypertext organization combines the stability of a 
hierarchical bureaucratic organization with the dynamism of the flat, cross-functional 
task-force organization through coordination of time, space and resources (Nonaka, 
1994, 33):  
The hypertext organization is an organizational struc ure that enables 
orchestration of different rhythms or ‘natural frequency’ generated by various 
project teams and the hierarchical organization. It coordinates the allocation of 
time, space and resource within the organization so as to compose an 
‘organizational’ rhythm that makes organizational knowledge creation more 
effective and efficient.  
There are three layers in the hypertext organization. The lowest layer, the knowledge 
base, constitutes a corporate university of tacit and explicit knowledge, or a 
‘clearinghouse for the new knowledge generated’ (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, 170). 
There is no corresponding term or function described in conventional networking 
theories, but we see strong similarities with so-called knowledge networks. The second 
layer, the business system, is the formal hierarchical organization in which the routine 
operations are carried out. This corresponds to the hierarchical networks in classic 
networking theories and the process networks in Figure 1. Finally, Nonaka’s loosely 
linked self-organizing project teams, including the area in which they create knowledge, 
constitute the top layer corresponding to the project n twork in Figure 1.  
At the very same time as Nonaka introduced his hypertext organization, (Hedlund, 1994; 
1995, 20) proposed a concept of a three-dimensional org nization structure with striking 
similarities: ‘a positional one which is likely to resemble a traditional hierarchy, one for 
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knowledge and one for action, where the use of temporary projects and teams figure 
prominently’. 
Organizational knowledge creation is a process of dynamic knowledge and information 
cycles that traverse all three layers. Members of pr ject teams are selected from diverse 
functions and departments across the business-system layer to engage in knowledge-
instead of the 1994 creating activities. Once the task is completed, the team members 
move down to the knowledge-base layer to make an inventory of the knowledge created. 
When this is completed, the members move up again, b ck to their original business-
system layer to perform routine activities until new projects are created. This is a 
continuous process and ‘the ability to switch swiftly and flexibly between the three 
layers in the hypertext organization is critical toits success’ (Nonaka, 1994, 33). 
Similarly, the success factor in Porsche’s commercialization of ceramic brakes was 
Spiderman’s rapid access to experts (die kurze Wege der Experten) within and beyond 
the company (Harryson and Lorange, 2005). The knowledge created in the teams is 
different from that accumulated in the business-system, and both types of knowledge 
are mixed into the knowledge base of the hypertext organization. Porsche acquired a 
unique ceramic technology for revolutionary brake systems. Once acquired, the related 
knowledge and technology were stored and diffused to another division that applied 
them to a high performance clutch system. 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, 171) do not describe how to develop a capability to 
acquire and integrate extracorporate knowledge. In fact, neither conventional 
networking theory nor Nonaka or Hedlund propose anyequivalent of the creativity 
network in Figure 1. Moreover, they do not describe the participation of external experts 
in their respective action networks. As this is an essential component in know-who 
based entrepreneurship, it will be amply illustrated in the case studies. Another 
dimension that seems to be lacking in most theories and concepts is the synergetic 
relationship between external and internal networking that drives knowledge creation 
and innovation in know-who based entrepreneurship. The roots of this synergy can 
partly be explained with those networking theories that distinguish between the nature 
and characteristics of open and close networks, based partly on weak and strong ties – 
outlined below. 
 
2.1.6 INTRODUCING OPEN AND CLOSED NETWORKS 
Along the connectivity dimension of the social network, we can distinguish between 
open and closed networks. Having no social capital on which to rely, the open network 
is mainly about resource exchange of information, while the closed network focuses on 
social exchange, trust and shared norms (Walker et al., 1997). An example of an open 
network is one in which firms have direct social contacts with all their partners, but 
these partners do not have any direct contacts with eac  other. A high number of such 
non-connected parties, or structural holes, means that the network consists of few 
redundant contacts and is information rich, since people on either side of the hole have 
access to different flows of information (Burt, 1992; 1993). This implies that the 
structure of an open network is suitable when the purpose of the network is knowledge 
creation by maximizing the number of contacts gathering, processing and screening new 
sources of information. This kind of creativity network then stresses the indirect linkage, 
has mainly weak relationships and is loosely coupled.  
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The opposite is the tightly coupled closed network, where all partners have direct and 
strong ties with each other. This network is centered on social capital, which is built 
through trust and shared norms and behavior (Coleman, 1988). Embeddedness in dense 
networks supports effective knowledge transfer and interfirm cooperation (Ahuja, 2000; 
Granovetter, 1985; Walker et al., 1997). This corresponds to the ideal characteristics of 
a process network in Figure 1.4. 
  
2.1.7 PROPOSING AN OPTIMAL NETWORK STRUCTURE 
Ahuja (Ahuja, 2000) lights the contradiction between open and closed networks and 
proposes that the larger the number of structural holes spanned by a firm, the greater its 
innovation output. There seems to be a trade-off betwe n a large loosely coupled 
network that maximizes information benefits and a smaller tightly coupled network 
promoting trust building and more reliable information. This contraction is studied in 
the context of project teams by Soda et al. (2004) who argue that the best performing 
teams are those with strong ties among the project members based on past joint-
experience, but with a multitude of current weak ties to complementary, non-redundant 
resources. By mainly recruiting researchers who have already worked as academic 
collaboration researchers, Porsche illustrates the suggested model of Soda et al. (2004) 
in getting project teams with high past closure (strong ties within the team based on 
prior collaboration) and high current structural holes (multiple weak ties to 
nonredundant resources at universities held by the new recruits). Chapter 7 offers more 
empirical support to this theoretical argument. 
If we apply the findings of Soda et al. (2004) to our general framework in Figure 1.4, 
the project networks will typically optimize performance by having core team members 
who share strong past experience while also having many weak ties to complementary 
recourses that can take the form of creativity networks. Again, this corresponds 
perfectly to the project network of Spiderman, who had strong ties to all his internal 
team members – all of whom had many weak ties to complementary knowledge both 
within and outside of Porsche. However, some of the nonreduntant external ties were 
strong – not weak. One example is the link to Mr. Gandissimo who provided the 
critical brakepads. We may need further levels of distinction that goes beyond this 
initial argument of strong and weak ties. 
 
2.1.8 EXPLORING THE STRONG IMPORTANCE OF WEAK TIES 
Granovetter is the pioneer in highlighting and exemplifying the importance of weak ties 
in linking otherwise unconnected networks. He argues that individuals with few weak 
ties have difficulties to be up-to-date with information from distant parts of the social 
system, and that ‘social systems lacking in weak ties will be fragmented and incoherent’ 
(Granovetter, 1973, 106). In the context of innovation he argues that new ideas more 
often emanate through weak ties from the margins of a specific network rather than 
through strong ties from its core or its nucleus. Accordingly, the relative strength of 
weak ties can transform marginal idea creating networks into a new nucleus of 
innovation. This argument poses new challenges to the science of innovation 
management: if the idea creation process is centered within and around marginal 
networks and their relatively unstructured weak ties, t becomes difficult to manage the 
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main source of innovation and hence also difficult to control the innovation process as a 
whole – at least if attempted to do it all within oe and the same company.  
As it is argued that weak ties can be developed and leveraged quite easily (Håkansson et 
al., 1999), the good news is that creativity and new ideas can be acquired with no 
trouble. On the other hand, the weak tie argument suggests that it is very challenging to 
influence the outcome of such creativity, as it is hard to actually control activities 
emerging through weak ties (cf., Tidd et al., 2001). Accordingly, all case studies will 
include the dimension of managing partly or entirely xternal creativity networks. In 
addition, Chapter 7 will be devoted to illustrate and explore how companies can steer 
and control external exploratory research – performed in collaboration with universities. 
In many cases, innovation requires management of both weak and strong ties cutting 
across both peripheral and core networks with a strong focus on developing and 
managing relationships for transfer and transformation of information into innovation. 
Therefore, it seems critical to analyze and better understand the nature of the ties in the 
three types of networks outlined in Figure 1.4. 
  
2.1.9 WEAK TIES FOR SIMPLICITY – STRONG TIES FOR COMPLEXITY? 
The main-argument of Granovetter (1973) is that disant and infrequent relationships, 
which represent weak-ties, are efficient for knowledg  acquisition and sharing as they 
offer access to new knowledge by bridging otherwise disconnected individuals and 
spheres of knowledge within or across organizations. Similarly, Weick (1976) argues 
that organizational entities that are only loosely tied to other entities are more adaptive 
because they are less constrained by the organization system of which they are part. Put 
simply, they can raid around and tap into others’ bainpower without getting tied up by 
formal requirements to assist various teams or units.  
Hansen (1999) uses a network study to explore how weak inter-unit ties help a new 
product development team with purposeful knowledge-sharing. His findings are that 
while weak ties help the team find new knowledge located in other units, the weak ties 
are not useful in supporting the actual transfer of c mplex knowledge. The more 
complex the knowledge, the stronger the ties requird to support its transfer. If these 
findings are correct, it would be reasonable to assume that weak ties will accelerate 
development speed when the required knowledge is not complex. Conversely, weak ties 
will not be supportive, or even slow down speed, in situations of high knowledge 
complexity. Research findings by Hite and Hesterly (2001), Uzzi (1996), Rowley et al. 
(2000) and Van Wijk et al. (2003) confirm that strong ties are positively related to firm 
performance when the environment demands a relatively high degree of exploitation, 
and that weak ties are beneficial for exploration purposes and to prevent the network’s 
insulation from market imperatives.  
A critical problem remaining unsolved by all authors reviewed in this last section is that 
of managing and steering the ‘uncontrollable fuzzy front end’ of innovation, as this 
depends mainly on weak ties. In this context, the arguments of structural holes and 
bridge ties, outlined below, offer new possibilities to take better control of networked 
innovation.  
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2.1.10 USING STRUCTURAL HOLES AND BRIDGE TIES TO TAKE CONTROL OF 
NETWORKED INNOVATION 
Burt (1992, 65) describes the way in which ‘social structure renders competition 
imperfect by creating entrepreneurial opportunities for certain players and not for 
others’. He distinguishes between: financial, human and social capitals, and argues that 
social capital is as critical as financial and human c pitals. Social capital is at once the 
structure of contacts in a network and resources thy each hold, in particular who they 
can reach and how they can reach them. Easily accumulated contacts with alike people 
do not expand the network as much as they fatten it, weakening its efficiency and 
effectiveness by increasing contact redundancy and tyi g up time. Burt (1992, 72) holds 
that ‘increasing the network size without considering diversity can cripple the network 
in significant ways’. What matters is the number of nonredundant contacts, which lead 
to new people who bring new information benefits.  
A network dense with redundant contacts is virtually worthless as a monitoring device 
because the strong relations between people in the network means that each person 
knows what the other people know, so they will discover the same opportunities at the 
same time. The dense network is inefficient in the sense that it returns less diverse 
information for the same cost as the sparse network. A solution is to put more time and 
energy into adding nonredundant contacts to the dense network. Nonredundant contacts 
are connected by a structural hole, which is a relationship of nonredundancy between 
two contacts. The hole is a buffer, like an insulator in an electric circuit. As a result of 
the hole between them, the two contacts provide network benefits that are synergetic 
rather than overlapping. Nonredundant contacts are disconnected in one of the following 
two ways: either directly in the sense that there is no direct contact, or cohesion, 
between the two persons, or indirectly in the sense that one person has contacts that 
exclude the other person’s contacts. Conversely, two contacts are redundant to the 
extent that they are connected to each other by a strong relationship, which indicates the 
absence of a structural hole. In addition to cohesion, structural equivalence is another 
useful indicator for detecting structural holes. Two people are structurally equivalent to 
the extent that they have the same contacts. Regardl ss of the relation between 
structurally equivalent people, they lead to the same sources of information and are 
therefore redundant. While cohesion concerns direct connection, structural equivalence 
concerns indirect connection by mutual contact. For example, if three contacts have no 
direct ties with each other they are nonredundant by cohesion. However, if the social 
network of each contact leads to the same cluster of more distant players then the 
contacts are redundant by structural equivalence. 
The optimized network has two design principles: fficiency and effectiveness. The 
efficiency principle says that you should maximize the number of nonredundant 
contacts in the network to maximize the yield in the structural holes. The effectiveness 
principle requires a shift in perspective. Burt (1992) distinguishes between primary and 
secondary contacts and recommends to focus resource on preserving the primary 
contacts. The shift in perspective is that contacts re not people on the other end of the 
contact’s relations; they are instead ports of access to clusters of people. Instead of 
maintaining relations with all contacts, the task of maintaining the total network is 
delegated to primary contacts. Where efficiency concer s the average number of people 
reached with a primary contact, effectiveness concerns the total number of people 
reached with all primary contacts. Accordingly, efficiency concerns the yield per 
primary contact, while effectiveness concerns the yield of the network as a whole.   
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We typically tend to live in clusters of strong relationships, which allow information to 
circulate at a high velocity, but each member of the cluster tends to know what the other 
members know as well. Therefore, and this is the key proposition of Burt (1992, 82), 
‘ the spread of information on new ideas and opportunities must come through the weak 
ties that connect people in separate clusters’. Weak ties are essential to the flow of 
information that integrates otherwise disconnected social clusters into a broader society.  
Burt’s structural-hole argument complements the strngth of weak ties argument of 
Granovetter (1973) in two interrelated ways. First, the causal agent in the phenomenon 
is not the weakness of tie itself, but the structural hole that it spans. Tie weakness is a 
correlate, but not a cause of access to nonredundant information. Second, by shifting 
attention away from the structural hole responsible for information benefits to the 
strength of the tie providing them, the weak-tie argument obscures the control benefits 
of structural holes. In other words, the structural-hole argument gives us new 
possibilities to manage and steer the previously uncontrollable information benefits in 
the fuzzy front end of innovation. 
While Granovetter’s (1973) weak tie argument focuses on the strength of relationships 
that span the chasm between the two structural clusters, Burt’s (1992) structural hole 
argument is about the actual chasm spanned – not on the strength of the relationship that 
spans the gap. It is the chasm spanned that generats information benefits through its 
function as a bridge over a structural hole. Nonredundant (typically weak) ties are 
bridges to other clusters. The bridge strength is an aside in Burt’s (1992) structural hole 
argument, because information benefits are expected to travel over all bridges, strong or 
weak. His focus is more on how networking benefits vary between redundant and 
nonredundant ties, which are not always equal to strong and weak ties. The task of the 
strategic player is to build an efficient and effective network through excellent selection, 
development and nurturing of bridge ties. Full attention to relationship management is 
key to preserve the information benefits of bridges, or else they will ‘simply’ fall into 
their natural state of being weak ties.   
The bridge tie of Spiderman to Mr. Grandissimo was very strong indeed and yet it 
closed a structural hole between Porsche and an external network that secured partly 
exploration and mainly exploitation (production) of ceramic materials for brakepads. 
Accordingly, we have reasons to believe that access to complementary nonredundant 
resources and skills also can be given through strong ties – and not only through weak 
ones. 
 
2.1.11 SUMMARIZING COMPLEMENTARITIES OF STRONG AND WEAK TIES 
Based on the arguments outlined above, it seems reasonable to assume that strong and 
weak ties are complementary from the perspective of time, and that the structure of an 
ideal network should maximize the yield per primary contact. We also learn that weak 
ties are likely to promote diversity and creativity in idea creation and accelerate 
development speed in early phases of exploration when t e required knowledge is not 
complex. Conversely, weak ties may slow down speed in situations of high knowledge 
complexity where strong ties are required to support integration of results for 
exploitation of innovation – as opposed to further disintegration into new creative sub-
problems. Accordingly, it seems that radical innovation requires management of both 
weak and strong ties cutting across both peripheral and core networks with a strong 
focus on developing and managing relationships for transfer and transformation of 
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information into innovation across multiple levels. Weak ties seem to be particularly 
useful in open creativity networks to enrich the creation and exploration of new 
knowledge. Wide know-who will be the main-driver in extensive networks of 
complementary (non-redundant) knowledge. Conversely, trong ties are more critical in 
rather closed process networks to drive the integraion of innovation – from a creative 
concept into solid business plans, prototypes and commercial products. Strong know-
how is the driver in a focused network of similar knowledge. Know-who will add 
complementary knowledge when required. As illustrated by Spiderman, this 
complementary knowledge can also be acquired by a strong bridge tie across a 
structural hole – and not always through weak ties. This book argues that successful 
spidermen are highly multicompetent acting in core teams of past strong ties and a 
multitude of current weak ties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  A Networked Perspective of Know-Who Based Entrepreneurship 
Figure 2 summarizes the network perspective of know-who based entrepreneurship – 
still with multicompetent spidermen at the core, but with a clearer positioning of the 
complementary but structurally contrasting networks: open vs. closed, and (typically) 
weak vs. strong managed organically vs. hierarchically-. Our framework suggests that 
firms with relationships in open networks have greater latitude in their innovation 
strategies as they have more extensive and nonredundant opportunities for collaboration 
(Burt, 1992). Also, the more social capital available to a firm in terms of know-who and 
relationship-ability, the less resources it needs to manage existing relationships and the 
more resources it can use to establish new ones (Walker et al., 1997). 
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
Our approach is to build a deep understanding of how R&D processes evolve over time. 
Accordingly, we started the interview process back in 2007 and finalized our last 
interviews in January 2009.  
Closed
Type of
Network
Open
Weak / Typical Strength of Ties /     Strong /
Organic Managerial Hierarchy Hierarchical
Multicompetent Spidermen 
Spinning Bridge Ties
between Creativity-
and Process 
Networks
Open
Creativity
Networks
for Exploration 
of Invention
Closed Process Networks 
for Exploitation of Innovation
• Rapid processing of complex 
knowledge through strong ties
• Focus on convergence and 
integration of knowledge
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The two cases also serve as our preferred basis for further investigation of the topic of 
this paper – based on the long-term relationships developed with the informants who 
share our interest in advancing the knowledge frontiers in this area.  
Our research method is based on abduction (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 1994; Dubois and 
Gadde, 2002) combining elements from both the inductive approach and the deductive 
approach. Continuous matching of theories with reality and vice versa has been our 
approach to secure empirical support for the theoretical framework. The basis for this 
process is a holistic multiple case study (Yin, 2003) combined with the combination of 
theories outlined above.  
The empirical data has been collected from the two case companies; Tetra Pak and 
Porsche. Within Tetra Pak the interviews covered the person in charge of the 
establishment of the R&D unit in China and the overall R&D transfer process. 
Furthermore several researchers with expatriate exprience were interviewed in order to 
tap into their experience. All interviewees have ben interviewed several times in order 
to enable tracking of the development of the investigated case over time. Within Tetra 
Pak, interviews were made both in Scandinavia and in China. In China, we interviewed 
employees in the foreign R&D center as well as the universities – so as to get a more 
complete picture. Complementary information in terms of secondary data has been 
collected, but the main parts of the empirical data have been primary data, which have 
been collected by the use of semi-structured interviews in person and by phone.  
Through the use of multiple sources for the case studies internal validity concern has 
been addressed for the case studies in terms of number of interviewees and their 
positions in the organizations. The purpose of presenting quotes from a large number of 
interviewees was to add verisimilitude and represent a wider network of the different 
actors across multiple levels in the cases.  
The issue of construct validity and reliability has been addressed as key informants have 
reviewed the case reports – both the individual cases as well as a previous draft of this 
paper. External validity is enhanced by covering two quite different industries - and two 
different geographical contexts, which are Europe (Porsche) and the emerging economy 
China (Tetra Pak) enabling comparisons between different industries and geographical 
contexts. It is also enhanced by developing a relativ ly industry-independent theoretical 
framework using the abductive approach outlined in this section. 
The aim is theoretical development, rather than testing of theories or common 
‘grounded theory’ approaches with the objective to continuously assessing the empirical 
support of a theory, or, inversely, a reality’s theoretical support, through the matching of 
theories with realities (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). This research project has been a 
combination of in-depth empirical research and reflection in action (Schön, 1983). 
 
4. CASE STUDIES: PORSCHE AND TETRA PAK  
The empirical material presented here is based on anew product development project 
from Porsche and a new product development- and R&D transfer project from Tetra 
Pak. 
4.1 PORSCHE - GIVE ME A BRAKE 
Porsche and Mercedes-Benz were competing against time to bring out the first ceramic 
brake system into the market of commercial vehicles. In the late 1990s, the CEO of 
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Porsche was well aware of their know-how disadvantage: They had started their 
research efforts in this field much later than Mercedes-Benz, and had less than one tenth 
the number of researchers in-house. Still, the CEO ordered his relatively small 
engineering team to give him a ceramic brake system by 2002, which should be able to 
last 300 000 km and withstand temperatures above 1000 ºC without being oxidized 
(conventional iron brake discs last 60 000 km and withstand temperatures at 700°C). So 
far, ceramic brakes had only been used in racing cars and aerospace applications. 
Ceramic brakes discs enable weight reduction and higher brake performance also at 
elevated temperatures. When the project was initiated F1 cars used carbon-carbon discs 
similar to ceramic brakes, which needed to be changed every 1000 kilometers and 
therefore it was not feasible to implement the existing brake in ordinary cars. The 
American F16 Fighters were using ceramic brake system  with much higher longevity 
than the F1 applications, but the very special Ceramics Silicon Carbide solution was top 
confidential and neither accessible to Porsche, nor to Mercedes-Benz.  
 
4.2 SPINNING A NETWORK OF GLOBAL KNOW-HOW 
The few material researchers of Porsche were not focused on internal exploratory 
research, but on global networking and technology intell gence to identify and bring 
together the most relevant external sources of know-h  in this area. Spiderman – the 
experienced Head of Porsche Brake Systems Engineering – had developed state of the 
art brake systems for more than thirty years. He sel ct d two academic research 
institutes and gave them one year each to explore and consolidate decades of research in 
the related areas and develop a specific compound based on ceramics and very special 
carbon fiber. He also had a research collaboration w th Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und 
Raumfahrt (DLR), which in the end resulted in a couple of strategic patents – now 
exclusively owned by Porsche. In addition, Porsche had five experienced manufacturing 
process-chain and quality management experts with great system understanding, who 
dedicated significant time to the project. Traditionally, Brembo in Italy was the partner 
of choice in Porsche’s brake systems, but as Brembo als  worked with important 
competitors including Mercedes-Benz, Porsche started to look for another development 
partner for this specific project. Spiderman identified a company that did not have any 
experience in automotive components, but had absolute world-class competence in 
carbon ceramics for aerospace and industrial applications. More important still, this 
company also had a strategic partnership with the American aerospace composite 
company that was the owner of the proprietary surface treatment technology used for 
the F16 fighters. 
Spiderman now had spun a forceful network consisting of one specialized supplier for 
ceramic materials to produce the actual disc, and two suppliers to develop the calipers 
and other critical components required to assemble a complete brake system. The 
perhaps most challenging requirement for this new brake-disc amalgamation was to 
maintain the required structural properties at tempratures exceeding 1000 degrees 
centigrade – in addition to the longevity requirement of 300 000 kilometers of normal 
use. The first prototypes of the new ceramic discs worked only until temperatures of 
650 degrees, after which some of the carbon material v porated and the disc was 
oxidized. Further material exploration was called for so as to optimize the organization 
of the silicon carbide in the disc and reduce or prevent oxidation of its active surface. To 
solve this and related manufacturing problems further networking was required. 
Spiderman, who had already brought in a dozen academic researchers from the two 
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domestic institutes, now made a more extensive networking effort. Spiderman also 
made visits to the American aerospace composite company to learn about their surface 
treatment know-how, which he brought back to his own network of engineers in 
Germany. 
Spiderman organized open seminars to present the status of Porsche’s most strategic 
development project. Of course, competitors such as Mercedes sent their leading experts 
to these seminars. They asked questions and contributed to a dialogue that helped 
Spiderman make better progress in the project. Moreover, Spiderman spotted the best 
expert and acquired him into his own project network – by asking DLR to recruit the 
expert, who was then transferred into the ceramic brake development team. 
Porsche funded the research made by the academic partners to secure exclusive patent-
ownership of the unique geometry that was developed. Porsche also performed all 
quality control of the new components. This was made in the new center, which counted 
a total of thirty people of which less than ten were regular Porsche employees. The 
quality control was a particularly important aspect wi h respect to product liability 
issues. Here, Porsche’s thirty years of experience i  designing highly competitive brake 
systems added significant value to the collaborative network. As the new disc 
manufacturing partner did not have any prior know-how in automotive parts, Porsche 
had to invest several thousand man hours in knowledge transfer activities to add this 
critical know-how to their new supplier of the revolutionary ceramic disc. 
Through the extensive networking and mobilization of leading know-how from several 
countries and continents, the project network of Porsche identified a revolutionary 
ceramic brake system solution. To achieve the goal, a technology to prevent the 
oxidation of the carbon fibre had to be developed. The extended network created the 
unique solution of applying a silicon carbide matrix o the carbon fibre, which generated 
a carbon ceramic(C/SiC). The resulting product featured both better durability and 
safety. 
The new discs – commercially available since 2002 – offer higher performance during 
heavy workloads both in dry and wet environments. The actual weight reduction of 60 
per cent, which is about 5 kg per wheel, has an enormous impact since it affects fully 
unsuspended weight. Ceramic composite brake discs al o offer the advantage of zero 
corrosion and shorter braking distance. 
Porsche holds the full patent for the geometry, but maintained only two years of 
exclusive rights to commercialize the system so as to capture both licensing revenues 
and better scale-economies in manufacturing. Two leading car manufacturers are 
already licensing the new technology from Porsche to apply it to their high-performance 
models. In this way, the networking strategy resulted both in brand enhancing patent 
protected innovation leadership and in additional revenues.  
 
4.3 TETRA PAK 
Tetra Pak already had a strong global footprint with China being the single largest 
market when it decided to establish a new R&D center in the emerging economy. 
Manufacturing capability had been established since early 2000 and the plan was to 
follow with R&D – mainly to reduce time to market for new higher-performance and 
lower-cost distribution equipment. There was an increasing need for low-cost 
distribution equipment in China, but this would require significant innovation to fulfill 
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the very challenging cost and performance targets. Transferring R&D to China was a 
bold move to take a fundamentally new approach to the whole innovation process. 
Rather than doing R&D at the home base R&D unit andthen transfer the results to 
China for manufacturing, it was decided to establish a new R&D center dedicated to 
innovation excellence using a more open and networked university collaboration 
approach. The company arranged an innovation contest in distribution equipment 
between well-selected key universities. External consultants were engaged to support 
identification of the right researchers. Professors coached masters and PhD students to 
conduct joint brainstorming sessions in order to develop new concepts. xx Sigvald 
please verify that the following two sentences are true: One of the involved Chinese 
professors invited not only the participating team t his university to come up with ideas, 
but included also approximately 300 further students at the University to come up with 
good ideas to be used in the project. Tetra Pak applauded this initiative. New 
relationships between employees of Tetra Pak and local students were fostered during 
the brainstorming sessions and the consecutive coaching sessions. In order to update 
and develop the concepts further, additional information was given to the student teams 
during the review sessions of the early concept ideas. These sessions were organized 
such that all teams had access to the feedback given to ach individual team thereby 
ensuring cross fertilization of ideas between the competing teams. During two different 
review sessions several concepts were reviewed in Europe as a result of the contest. The 
first session provided a neutral third party opinion from a dozen invited technology 
consultants. During the second session one concept was selected for further 
development by Tetra Pak’s distribution equipment experts. The winning university was 
invited to temporarily join Tetra Pak’s R&D center in Sweden to acquire advanced 
CAD training focused on further validation and early implementation of the concept. 
Also the coaching professor was joining this “human knowledge transfer” from China 
to Sweden. Further collaboration continues in China also with those universities that did 
not win the first innovation competition. 
 
5. ANALYSIS  
Knowing who has the know-how, defining new access points to this know-how and 
converting it into new value networks created a new breakthrough for Porsche. 
Knowing who has the know-how was made possible by deliberately spilling over- or 
sharing knowledge with external parties including employees working for competitors. 
The innovation contest between the universities enabl d Tetra Pak to reach new avenues 
of thought in terms of the eager young minds at the universities without formally 
managing or employing more people. The consultants - university professors functioned 
as structural holes, which identified the talent pool t  include in the project. 
 
5.1.1 KNOCKOUT NETWORKING LESSONS 
Let us start with some terminology: Porsche clearly recognizes a need to leverage 
external brainpower for exploration of innovation, i.e., for creative research and 
discovery. For this purpose, Spiderman establishes contacts to so-called creativity 
networks. The creativity network is mainly an open and loosely coupled arms-length 
network encompassing primarily weak ties to selected external scientists and experts. 
The purpose of the creativity network is to create new scientific knowledge that can be 
transformed into commercialized innovation by a project network.  
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The purpose of a project network is to manage the balancing act between exploration 
and exploitation so as to secure breakthrough innovati n. Spiderman builds a project 
network that involves two academic centers of brainpower and a large number of 
leading experts who secure the initial knowledge creation required to define the ceramic 
material. However, defining a material is still farrom pursuing a full innovation cycle. 
This is why a so-called process network was required to secure development and 
manufacturing of the ceramic material in the desired shape of a disc.  
As a company, Porsche has innovated both the processes and business models for 
absorption of external technologies and skills and places very strong emphasis on social 
ties.  
The relationship-dimension of the Porsche case suggests that a dominance of weak ties 
is beneficial for exploration in open creativity networks, and a dominance of strong ties 
is required for exploitation in more closed process networks. In network terms, the 
process network is therefore closed, tightly coupled, and hierarchical. The creativity 
network is the complete opposite with a relatively open structure. It contains both 
individual and organizational levels. As illustrated by the case, the creativity networks 
are mainly social networks, driven by personal relationships. Selected individuals at the 
universities are more important than the universitie  hemselves. Accordingly, the social 
networks are dominating the organizational networks and act mainly as antecedents of 
organizational networks. The project network is a mix of creativity- and process 
networks, being semi-open at the beginning and more closed during the exploitation 
phase, when bridging the two opposing networks. 
The mini case also illustrates how a typical breakthrough innovation evolution starts 
with a dominance of creativity networks to mobilize th  required expertise to develop a 
revolutionary concept. The evolution continues by linking the exploration-oriented 
creativity networks to exploitation-oriented process networks to manage the conversion 
from knowledge creation to business implementation for breakthrough innovation to 
happen. The process network-dominance in the exploitation phase was witnessed by 
Porsche’s integration of the best individuals from the creativity networks into the 
process network at Porsche’s premises where most actors involved finally ended up. 
 
5.2 COMPARISON OF PORSCHE AND TETRA PAK 
Although the two case companies operate within different industries some similarities 
can be identified, since both companies are active on the business to business (B2B) 
market. Although Porsche can be characterised as a company, which is active within 
high-end consumer products, the main profit generator for Porsche is to provide R&D 
services and license out their technologies to other car manufacturers. 
In the Porsche case deliberate and intended knowledge spillover enabled identification 
of strategically important external knowledge to be internalised and applied by the 
company. 
Company Goal of the innovation strategy 
Porsche  • Develop ceramic brakes for standard 
vehicles 
Tetra Pak • Develop low-cost distribution equipment in 
China 
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Table 1.  Innovation strategy goals of the case companies 
 
 
Company Core elements in the innovation strategy  
Porsche  • Clearly defined desired result 
• University competitions 
• Intended knowledge spillover to: 
universities, invited experts of competitors, 
unexperienced suppliers with 
complementary skills 
• The R&D activities of the company are 
highly outsourced 
Tetra Pak • Less clearly defined desired result 
• University competitions 
• Intended knowledge spillover to universities 
• The R&D Activities of the company are in-
house focused and the winning university 
was invited to join the R&D Headquarters 
in Lund for four months 
Table 2.  Core elements of innovation strategy of the case companies 
  
Company Experienced benefits of intended knowledge 
spillover 
Porsche  • First to introduce ceramic brakes in the 
automotive industry 
• Brand Equity Increase - as a result of 
positive differentiation through innovation 
• Increased profits as a result of increased 
sales and licensing fees 
Tetra Pak • Time to market from concept to 
implementation 
• Total Innovation Project Cost relative to 
degree of Innovation 
• Impact in terms of anticipated increase in 
sales 
• Brand Equity Increase - as a result of 
positive differentiation through innovation 
in distribution equipment  
• Recruiting advantage through increased 
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awareness among leading Chinese 
universities 
Table 3.  Knowledge spillover benefits experienced by the case companies 
Whereas Tetra Pak was in need of brainpower for the more general mechanics and 
mechatronics related task of developing distribution equipment, Porsche was in need of 
more specialized brainpower and in this sense what Porsche was looking for was more 
clearly defined. 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
Knowledge management approaches such as disintegrating knowledge creation 
processes mitigates the non-productive use of strategically important spillover 
knowledge. They can, however, not prevent the spillover of knowledge as such! 
Actually, preventing knowledge spillover might harm the company since it may 
decrease the development of strategically important external knowledge which it is 
possible for the company to tap into. Especially the ability to identify strategically 
important external knowledge may be hampered if knowledge spillover is restricted 
excessively.  
Intended - and unintended knowledge spillover alike can have both positive and 
negative effects. 
Only if the spillover knowledge is used in ways which are negative for the knowledge 
contributing company is knowledge spillover negative for the contributing company!  
Positive R&D knowledge spillover can be defined as knowledge spillover, which either 
enables the improved use of knowledge assets already available for the company, and/or 
knowledge spillover which enables the use of relevant knowledge assets, which are not 
available for the company. 
To share or not to share knowledge is not the question. The question is if knowledge 
sharing and knowledge spillover are managed or not. D es it happen as a result of an 
intended and deliberate process which enables the company to capitalise in new ways 
on the contributed knowledge, or does it happen in un tended ways which may or may 
not harm the company? If the company does not manage its spillover knowledge, 
instead knowledge spillover will manage the company! 
We readily admit that intended - and unintended knowledge spillover alike, can cause 
negative knowledge spillover. The former may, however, be less likely than the latter 
and intended knowledge spillover can facilitate new benefits, which makes it worth it to 
run the related risks! 
Through symbiotic networking and relationship management, new shortcuts to bridge 
the gap between exploration and exploitation can be found so as to accelerate the 
process from knowledge creation to business-implementation.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS - CONTRIBUTION TO INNOVATION THEORY AND /OR PRACTICE  
The recommendation should be to change from an excessive focus on the negative side 
of knowledge spillover and instead to consider the knowledge creation and innovation 
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potential related to mutual sharing and creation of knowledge between the company and 
its surrounding environment. 
By proactively facilitating knowledge sharing with relevant parts of the surrounding 
environment, the company enables itself to feed knowledge into its surrounding 
environment - thereby developing the innovation potential of the environment for 
exploration purposes, and the opportunities to ident fy and to feed knowledge back to 
the company for exploitation purposes, from the same environment. 
The resulting theoretical framework, built on the existing networking - and knowledge 
creation theories, is useful for the further analysis of positive R&D knowledge spillover 
effects. 
 
8. L IMITATION AND FURTHER RESEARCH  
The Porsche case gave an example of how innovation part ers can be used to recruit 
R&D employees from competitors in an indirect way without infringing competition 
clauses which may exist and which makes it illegal for employees to immediately start 
working for competitors. Open innovation as a way to work around competition clauses 
prohibiting employees to immediately start working for competitors when they quit a 
job is an area which might need further research.  
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 NOTES 
                                                 
i  Effective in the sense that any networking activities are explicitly targeted towards 
the type of knowledge needed for business purposes, e.g., a specific project, or a 
special skill needed for a process. 
ii  Efficient in the sense that the cost and efforts of their networking activities to 
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acquire, transform and apply knowledge are comparably low, thanks partly to their 
know-who, which supports rapid identification of both those who have the 
knowledge as well as of those who need it, and partly to their multicompetent skills, 
which support rapid acquisition and transformation f both tacit and explicit 
knowledge. 
